Original Steelman
Public procurement has long time horizons and high switching costs, so choices that maximize future substitutability are rational. Favoring open standards can reduce dependency on a single vendor by ensuring that data formats, interfaces, and protocols are publicly specified and implementable by multiple suppliers. This can lower barriers for competitors to bid on maintenance, upgrades, and replacement systems, improving bargaining power and reducing lifecycle costs. Open standards also support interoperability across agencies and jurisdictions, enabling reuse and integration rather than bespoke point solutions. Because procurement decisions can shape markets, a preference for open standards can encourage vendors to compete on service quality and price rather than proprietary lock-in. Even when open standards do not eliminate all switching costs, they can make exit more feasible by enabling data portability and multi-vendor ecosystems, which is especially valuable for critical public infrastructure.
Counter-Argument Steelman
Favoring open standards in procurement can be a blunt instrument that trades one set of risks for another. “Open” does not guarantee interoperability in practice: standards may be underspecified, inconsistently implemented, or extended in proprietary ways, so lock-in can persist at the implementation, data-model, or integration layer. A strict preference can also reduce competition if best-in-class solutions rely on de facto standards or proprietary interfaces, potentially increasing costs or lowering performance. Procurement rules that overweight standards compliance may incentivize checkbox behavior rather than outcomes (e.g., portability, exit plans, data export guarantees). Additionally, switching costs often come from organizational processes, customizations, and training—not just file formats or protocols—so open standards alone may not materially reduce lock-in. Finally, mandating open standards can slow adoption of innovative technologies where standards lag, and can shift risk to the public buyer if the standard’s governance is weak or fragmented.